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Adjustable-rate mortgages have typically been tied to either of two indexes, one based on U.S. treasuries, the other on the 
London interbank offered rate, or Libor. The index is used to determine a mortgage’s new interest rate when it is reset, and 
up until recently, the choice would have made little difference. But since 2007, the rates on which the indexes are based 
have diverged sharply, and borrowers with Libor-based adjustable-rate mortgages are likely to pay more than they would 
have had their mortgages been tied to treasuries. Moreover, the proportion of Libor-based ARMs has increased signiﬁ  -
cantly, especially for subprime loans.
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Changes in an adjustable-rate mortgage’s (ARM) interest rate 
result primarily from changes in the index rate on which it 
is based. The choice of index rate can vary from lender to 
lender, but prior to the recent turbulence in ﬁ  nancial markets, 
the particular index used mattered little. That’s because the 
indexes, themselves interest rates of similar maturities and 
risk-proﬁ  les, tended to move together. 
But as the ﬁ  nancial crisis has continued, this relationship has 
weakened. As a result, the index on which an ARM is based, 
something which might have seemed as inconsequential to 
a borrower as the typeface used on his mortgage contract, 
could now mean a much higher monthly payment for some. 
In particular, borrowers whose mortgages are based on an 
interest rate known as Libor might face a higher interest rate 
than the comparable borrower whose mortgage is tied to the 
other frequently used index, which is based on U.S. Treasury 
rates. In this Commentary, we examine what recent ﬁ  nancial 
market events might mean for borrowers with Libor-based 
mortgages. 
Libor and Treasury Rates
The London interbank offered rate, or Libor, is an average 
of the interest rates on uncollateralized loans made between 
banks in London for some term, ranging from overnight to 
one year. It is determined by the British Bankers’ Association, 
which each day polls its panel of banks on their respective 
borrowing costs. The rate has served as a baseline for many 
bank-to-bank transactions in U.S. dollars since its establish-
ment in 1986. It has also increasingly become the basis for 
many ﬁ  nancial transactions not occurring between banks, 
including residential mortgages. According to the British 
Bankers’ Association, the various maturities of Libor that 
are quoted for U.S. dollar-based borrowing collectively serve 
as indexes, or base rates, on approximately $150 trillion of 
outstanding ﬁ  nancial contracts.
In normal times, markets keep the interest rates for instruments 
of similar maturities and risks very comparable. Between 2000 
and 2006, for instance, Libor quotes for borrowing on terms 
of up to one year closely followed the rates on comparable-
maturity U.S. government securities, as has historically been 
the case. During this time, in fact, the six-month Libor was 
almost perfectly correlated with the six-month U.S. Treasury 
bill rate, with only a slight differential (0.25 percentage point 
on average) separating the two (see ﬁ  gure 1).
Index Rates for Adjustable-Rate Mortgages
The interest rate on an ARM is determined primarily by 
two components: its index rate and margin. An index rate is 
simply another interest rate, which is typically thought to be 
a good proxy for a lender’s borrowing costs. It is the part of 
an ARM’s interest rate that adjusts. The margin, by contrast, 
does not change over the term of the loan. It is expressed in 
percentage points and added to the index rate to determine an 
ARM’s interest rate at its periodic adjustment points. Larger 
margins are associated with higher-risk borrowers, as compen-
sation to the lender for these borrowers’ increased likelihood 
of default. For instance, in the subprime market, a standard 
ARM might use the six-month Libor as its index and add a 
6 percentage point margin. 
In recent years, a commonly used formulation for an ARM—
known as a hybrid ARM—calls for the interest rate to be reset 
after an initial period, frequently two or three years, during 
which time the rate is ﬁ  xed. For any ARM, resets generally 
occur monthly, semi-annually, or annually. In some cases, the 
extent to which an ARM’s interest rate can change during a 
reset is limited, or capped, and there also may be limits on the 
amount a mortgage’s rate can change from its initial rate.
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used: Libor and Treasury rates. Data from a sample of Ohio 
borrowers show that subprime mortgages have been based 
on Libor far more often than prime mortgages. According 
to this sample, before 2005 about two-thirds of the subprime 
ARMs originated in any year in Ohio were linked to Libor, 
with most of the remaining loans linked to Treasury rates. 
By 2007, nearly all subprime ARMs were linked to Libor. 
For prime loans, Libor was much less commonly used until 
recently. In 2000, fewer than one in ﬁ  ve prime ARMs were 
indexed to the rate, but by 2008, the ratio was roughly one of 
every two (see ﬁ  gure 2). The data cannot reveal the cause of 
this shift in index rates, but the shift has become signiﬁ  cant.
As troubles have spread from mortgage markets into the 
interbank market, the difference between Treasury rates and 
Libor has risen to unprecedented levels. The divergence 
began in August 2007, as serious concerns about mortgage-
backed assets began to emerge. At this point, the differential 
between six-month Libor and Treasury rates rose sharply 
to above 1 percentage point. By December, the differential 
had risen as high as almost 1.8 percentage points. There 
was some narrowing thereafter, but the differential remained 
high—about 1 percentage point—through the ﬁ  rst eight 
months of 2008. The correlation between Libor and Trea-
sury rates of various maturities also weakened substantially. 
In mid-September 2008, as several major U.S. ﬁ  nancial enti-
ties faced collapse, Libor and Treasury rates diverged further, 
and by early October, the differential between the six-month 
Libor and Treasury rates had grown to exceed 3.5 percent-
age points. This is a long way from the roughly quarter-
percentage point difference seen between 2000 and 2006. 
As banks have become increasingly unwilling to lend to 
one another, concerned about the ability of their typically 
reliable fellow banks to repay their loans, Libor rates have 
risen sharply. Meanwhile, Treasury rates have fallen sharply, 
further widening the deviation between same-maturity Libor 
and Treasury rates. Depressed Treasury rates reﬂ  ect a “ﬂ  ight-
to-quality,” in which businesses and banks have sought out 
the least risky and most liquid securities in the marketplace. 
This has driven up the prices of existing Treasury securities, 
lowering their effective yields. Indeed, the demand for safe, 
liquid assets has been so great that at times market partici-
pants have pushed the yield on some Treasury securities 
close to zero. 
Despite interventions by U.S. and U.K. authorities to 
improve the functioning of credit markets—including U.K. 
government guarantees on lending between its banks—the 
difference between six-month Libor and Treasury rates has 
remained close to 2 percentage points. As a consequence, 
many mortgages based on Libor are at risk of resetting to 
higher rates than mortgages for comparable borrowers based 
on Treasury rates. 
2.  Proportion of Libor-Based ARMs in Ohio, July 2008
a. Constant maturity series. 
Sources: British Bankers’ Association; “Selected Interest Rates,” 
Statistical Release H.15., Federal Reserve Board.
Average






Prime       
As of 7/2008 28.0 6.7 7.7 4.0
2008:H2 8.3 6.3 6.6 3.4
2009:H1 8.1 5.5 5.5 2.5
2009:H2 8.0 5.7 5.4 2.4
Subprime       
As of 7/2008 71.3 8.2 9.4 5.4
2008:H2 18.0 9.0 8.9 5.6
2009:H1 6.6 9.4 8.7 5.7
2009:H2 2.4 8.9 9.0 6.0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Spread and correlation in each period
 1.4.2000–  1.2.2007–  1.2.2008–
 12.29.2006  12.31.2007  11.7.2008 
Spread 0.26  0.64 1.31


























1. Six-Month Libor and Treasury Rates
3.  Interest Rates before and after Resets for Ohio 
Libor-Based ARMs
Sources: McDash Analytics; authors’ calculations.
Sources: McDash Analytics; authors’ calculations.
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How big an impact is this circumstance likely to have on 
borrowers with Libor-based mortgages? To answer that 
question, we looked at over 72,500 existing (as of July 2008), 
ﬁ  rst-lien, non-option ARMs in Ohio. Slightly more than half 
of these loans are linked to Libor, with the remainder linked 
to Treasury rates. However, Libor is a much more typical in-
dex for subprime mortgages: About 90 percent of subprime 
loans are linked to Libor, versus only about 45 percent of 
prime mortgages.
At ﬁ  rst, it appears that borrowers with Libor-based mortgages 
aren’t likely to be adversely affected by the unusual behavior 
of Libor. Using actual data for the six-month Libor, where 
available, and assuming a rate of 3.0 percent otherwise after 
July 2008, we see that interest rates, on average, stay roughly 
the same or fall for Libor-based mortgages scheduled to see 
their ﬁ  rst rate reset in the second half of 2008 (see ﬁ  gure 3.) 
Interestingly, interest rates for mortgages that were adjusted 
for the ﬁ  rst time before July 2008 (about 30 percent of 
prime mortgages and 70 percent of subprime mortgages in 
the sample) are now about a percentage point higher than 
their initial rates, on average. This reﬂ  ects the fact that the 
six-month Libor fell sharply at the end of 2007, about 2 
percentage points from the beginning of December to the 
end of January 2008. So mortgages that reset before the end 
of 2007, and that aren’t scheduled to reset again for a year, 
have yet to see the reduction in Libor reﬂ  ected in their rates. 
Nevertheless, Libor’s decline since the end of 2007 has, in 
general, been a help to those with Libor-based mortgages. But 
how different would the rates on these mortgages be if they 
had been indexed instead to the comparable Treasury rate? To 
determine this, we simulate the average interest rate over time 
for the Libor-based loans in our sample using two different 
interest rate indexes: an elevated six-month Libor, which we 
assume as before will be 3.0 percent for the foreseeable future, 
and a Libor more in line with a projected six-month Treasury 
rate. For the latter, we apply the approximate average spread 
between the six-month Libor and six-month Treasury rate 
from 2000 to 2006 (0.25 percentage points) and assume a six-
month Treasury rate of 1.0 percent, to produce an index rate 
of 1.25 percent. For every mortgage, we also apply any cap or 
ﬂ  oor provisions called for by the mortgage contract. 
Assuming a Libor of 3.0 percent produces little change as 
before, generating average interest-rate reductions of about 
0.5 percentage point for both prime and subprime loans by 
2011 (see ﬁ  gure 4). By contrast, the paths produced by the 
alternative Treasury index rate show more signiﬁ  cant de-
clines. The patterns of these declines also differ somewhat by 
mortgage grade. Average interest rates for the prime subset 
of mortgages decline gradually. This reﬂ  ects the fact that 
many mortgages in this group—more than 70 percent—had 
yet to see their ﬁ  rst rate-reset by July 2008, and the fact that 
resets occur for a fairly stable proportion of these borrowers 
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5.  Average Monthly Payment Difference 
per $100,000 of Principal
4.  Implied Future Interest Rates for Ohio 
Libor-based ARMs
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Prime Libor-Based Mortgages (capped)
Libor = 3.0%
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Libor = T-bill + 0.25%
Interest rate
Sources: McDash Analytics; authors’ calculations.
Sources: McDash Analytics; authors’ calculations.
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The subprime set of mortgages, on the other hand, under-
goes a much more rapid decline in its average interest rate 
within a short period; by the beginning of 2009, most of the 
1.75 percentage-point gap in the two alternative indexes has 
been realized. That’s because most of the subprime loans in 
this sample had already experienced their initial rate-reset by 
July 2008, and nearly 90 percent would have done so by the 
end of 2008. Interestingly, in our data, caps and ﬂ  oors ap-
pear to affect the simulated interest-rate paths for prime and 
subprime loans very little. 
How important are these different interest-rate paths for 
mortgage-holders? For a typical subprime borrower, the 
divergence of the two rate paths quickly translates into 
a monthly payment difference of about $100 for every 
$100,000 of remaining principal (see ﬁ  gure 5). For prime 
borrowers, the resulting difference is less dramatic, but still 
meaningful, rising to roughly $50 by the end of 2009. In the 
aggregate, these differences would cost Ohio’s Libor-based 
ARM-holders roughly an additional $34 million in 2009 
alone, should current interest-rate trends continue, with 
about 55 percent of this burden being shouldered by sub-
prime borrowers. 
Conclusion
Ongoing turmoil in ﬁ  nancial markets has caused two rates 
that typically track one another closely to diverge. The 
unexpected result is that some mortgage-holders will not see 
the interest-rate relief they otherwise might have received as 
Treasury rates have declined. The Federal Reserve, the U.S. 
government, and many foreign governments have inter-
vened aggressively to restore the normal functioning of the 
interbank lending market: Central banks have been lending 
outside of the usual channels and other government entities 
have guaranteed interbank lending, among other measures. 
These efforts have met with some success; however, the still-
elevated spread between short-term Libor and Treasury rates 
suggests that there may still be some way to go, even if rates do 
not return to past norms. Among other beneﬁ  ts, efforts to close 
this gap by bringing Libor more in line with lower Treasury 
rates will help homeowners whose rates are linked to Libor. 
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